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We identify trade in goods opportunities in a EU-Mercosul free trade area. Gains for Mercosul are 
rather concentrated, being mostly associated to a few agricultural commodities nowadays facing high 
protection  barriers.  EU  gains  are  evenly  spread,  comprising  a  variety  of  market  penetration 
possibilities. Trade deviation by the EU products is never higher than trade creation, confirming their 
international competitiveness and signalling that a great distortion of Mercosul’s imports won’t take 
place. Balanced gains exist for both sides; for Mercosul, the agreement can act as a first serious trial for 
future  liberalisations  with  other  developed  partners,  and  as  a  warning  on  needed  competitiveness 
improvements. 
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In the very year of its historical enlargement to the East, the European 
Union (EU) sat, for the third time, at the negotiating table with Latin American 
(LA) leaders, in the city of Guadalajara, Mexico. If it is undeniable that, after 
each of the two past Cumbres – Rio, June 25-26; 1999 and Madrid, May 17-18; 
2002 -, some progress has always been achieved, diplomats and agents from 
both sides are still at odds in deepening a supposedly strategic partnership that 
often reveals itself unable to move beyond sheer rhetoric. 
Reasons for the impasses and disappointments are numerous, but surely 
the diversity, in all aspects, of both regions and their different sets of priorities 
can account for a large part of the relatively modest results achieved until now. 
Economic motives, more than any others, have sometimes made the two parties 
act faster, and close deals as the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement (Lisbon, 
March  23;  2000)  and  the  EU-Chile  Association  Agreement  (Brussels, 
November  26;  2002).  It  is  no  wonder  that  these  treaties  were  the  result  of 
negotiations  with  a  single  Latin  American  country,  what  considerably 
simplified the agenda. 
Another  agreement  has  seen  its  proceedings  linger  on  at  least  since 
November 1999, when the EU-Mercosul Co-operation Council met in Brussels. 
Truly,  the  stakes  are  higher  in  this  case.  The  partner  is  a  common  market 
initiative, actually – under a variety of aspects - the regional integration that 
bears more affinities with the European project, and represents a rather sizeable 
part of South America. Two big economies and large countries, Argentina and 
Brazil, figure as members of the bloc, a region that includes key geographic systems in the continent: the Rio de la Plata basin, the Pantanal and (the largest 
part of) the Amazon forest. 
Fixing  the  EU-Mercosul  Agreement  would  mark  a  turn  in  the  EU-LA 
relations, signalling that the two sides want and can deepen their relationship. 
The economic and strategic importance of Mercosul and the historical times the 
EU is now living add an extra international impact to this decision. But can 
negotiators  in  both  sides  perceive  this,  and  go  beyond  their  minor 
disagreements and limited concessions ?  
The  present  study  unveils  potential  gains,  as  relates  to  trade  in  goods 
flows,  supposing  full  liberalisation  takes  place.  Instead  of  resorting  to  (the 
always necessary) global evaluations, that produce aggregate figures useful at 
certain,  well-defined  stages  of  the  negotiations,  we  opted  for  a  detailed 
analysis, at the product level, in which the gains for specific agents become 
clearer.  As  the  next  sections  show,  gains  lie  waiting,  in  both  sides,  for  the 
signing of the Agreement. They ran from reasonable to extremely attractive 
and, especially for the EU, don’t look at all disruptive. The inability to realise 
them will put businesses in a situation similar to the one at the time of the 
Europe 92 Initiative, turning benefits into costs for not signing the Agreement. 
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows:  in  section  1  we  discuss  the 
methodology and its limits, while section 2 offers a detailed view of the results. 
A  more  encompassing  perspective  is  adopted  in  section  3,  while  section  4 
concludes.  
 
1.  The Limits of the Study. 
We  concentrate  on  the  trade  in  goods  aspect  of  the  liberalisations 
envisaged. Negotiations in course comprise also other areas, notably services 
and  government  procurement.  However,  goods  make  for  the  basic  flows  in 
international trade and act as a catalyst for other exchanges, specially services. 
Moreover, those two additional issues are where more conflict exists, basically 
due  to  a  demandeur  position  by  the  European  Commission  (EC),  while Mercosul  shows  a  rather  defensive  attitude.  As  a  consequence,  it  is  more 
difficult to outline feasible liberalisation scenarios, not to say quantify them. 
We worked with products at the six-digit level of the Harmonised System 
(HS). Though the official offers from both sides are systematically made at the 
eight-digit  level,  this  was  thought  to  produce  an  excessive  level  of  detail, 
blurring the impact of our main goal: to identify market access opportunities for 
specific agents/firms in the two blocs. The six-digit level already conveys this 
information to the local producers concerned. 
Though we use standard trade-analytic tools, the way they are combined 
makes for a somewhat novel methodology. The Annex explains in more detail, 
with all main equations, the analytic tools and the steps required for arriving at 
the  final  results.  For  interpreting  the  findings,  it  suffices  to  understand  the 
following: 
Based  on  statistics  for  the  recent  trade  flows  we  select,  for  each  side, 
products for which prospective gains lie with the agreement. Such possibility is 
attributed to a product if it satisfies three requirements:  
i) complementarity between one bloc as exporter and the other as importer; 
ii) world comparative advantage (for the exporting bloc);  
iii)  the  tariff  equivalent  the  product  faces  at  the  importing  bloc  is  equal  or 
superior to 10 per cent. 
  Informally, if the product “scores high” in the three dimensions above, it 
qualifies for prospective gains with the agreement. Trade indexes are used for 
assessing the first two requirements; as for the last one, we computed, in an as-
best-as-possible  way,  tariff  equivalents  to  the  barriers  faced  by  the  exports. 
Ideally, these equivalent values include tariff and non-tariff barriers actually 
practised by the two partners. 
  For each identified product, we produce a US dollar value that portrays the 
market access gains. This “total value” results from adding up two effects, trade 
creation and trade  diversion, related, though not exactly, to the well-known 
ideas in the Vinerian analysis of preferential agreements.  The first is, in the classical view, a positive thing: the lower barriers open 
further the market for the (efficient) imported good. The second, still in the 
classical view, is “less positive”: the product from the partner in the agreement, 
though not the most efficient one, in world terms, becomes cheaper than the 
alternatives and, due to this, increases its market share.  
In our case, trade creation is obtained by the direct final-price-of-imports 
effect, supposing an infinite elasticity of supply and that the only change in 
imports is due to those from the partner. Trade diversion is computed assuming 
that  total  imports  remain  constant,  the  preference,  thanks  to  a  substitution 
effect,  then  causing  some  deviation  in  imports  from  outside  the  partner  in 
favour of it. An import price elasticity is needed to compute the former, and a 
substitution elasticity for the latter. At the six-digit level, the two effects may 
co-exist  and  this  explains  why  both  enter  in  the  market  gains.  Though  not 
exactly  reflecting  the  corresponding  classical  concepts,  a  very  large  trade 
deviation relative to the creation may signal – if the elasticities used are correct 
– that a true deviation will take place.  
In order to check the robustness of our conclusions, we worked with two 
base periods for the trade flows, 1997-1998 (the “golden years”) and 2000-
2001 (the “crises years”)
1. Simple averages of imports for the two periods were 
the basis for the simulations. As regards product selection, there wasn’t much 
difference between the two. We shall mainly discuss results for the 2000-2001 
period,  the  corresponding  calculations  being  thus  allowed  to  be  taken  as 
conservative.    
Two scenarios were considered: i) a reduction of 50 per cent in the ad-
valorem tariff equivalent; ii) a reduction of 100 per cent in the ad-valorem tariff 
equivalent.  Using  these  extreme,  uniform  concessions,  gives  a  full  grasp  of 
what the Agreement may bring forth, avoiding particular computations subject 
to the vagaries of the successive offers.  
Three different levels were used for the needed elasticities. A central value 
taken from the “Tariff & Trade” Data Base, OECD (2003); and an upper and a 
                                                            
1 For the reasons why “golden” and “crises” years, see section 3. lower bound equal, respectively, to the central value multiplied and divided by 
1.5. 
The  tariff  equivalents  were  extracted  with  the  help  of  the 
UNCTAD/TRAINS  database,  several  other  sources,  notably  the  previously 
mentioned OECD (2003), having been of extreme usefulness. 
The final dollar figures must not be taken at their precise, face value; their 
main utility is in providing a ranking of the opportunities, pointing out the main 
products to benefit from the agreement. Even so, they may be used as a first 
guess on the actual revenues, if the reader keeps in mind the limitations of the 
study.              
The first limitation is that the whole work is, in technical terms, a partial 
equilibrium evaluation. This means that, while analysing one product, all other 
markets “are frozen”, the computation of the effects completely disregarding 
any interaction the given product might have with the other segments of the 
economy. In practice, preferential agreements trigger multiple interactions, with 
different timings, and the partial equilibrium assumption is a (more or less) 
crude  approximation  of  the  reality,  Baldwin  and  Venables  (1995),  Flôres 
(1996).  However,  the  methodological  alternative,  computable  general 
equilibrium models, provides results at a rather aggregate level, and wouldn’t 
be compatible with the purpose of this study.  
There  is  no  clear  indication  whether  consideration  of  all  relevant 
interactions  would  produce  higher  or  lower  values  than  those  under  partial 
equilibrium. A rough guess can be made from an informal evaluation of the 
linkages the specific product bears in the bloc under examination. If it is tied to 
“winning or neutral” products, actual gains may be even higher. In the opposite 
case, gains may be inferior. In the absence of a minimally reliable informal 
evaluation  of  this  kind,  the  values  here  presented  should  be  taken  as  an 
(hopefully unbiased) average of positive and negative interactions. 
The  fact  that  each  gain  results  from  a  partial  equilibrium  calculation 
doesn’t authorise to add up the individual product values. We do however say a few words on both aggregate totals; numbers which consist in a rough, second 
best estimate of a total trade in goods gain.  
Another  limitation  is  parameter  values.  Elasticities  are  needed  for 
computing  the  trade  creation  and  diversion  effects.  As  said,  results  were 
obtained for three possible elasticity values: a lower, a central and an upper 
figure. This also allowed us to check the sensibility of our findings 
2.  
Computation  of  tariff  equivalents  is  always  debatable;  our  experience 
being that the final numbers usually underestimate the ultimate (tariff) effect of 
all barriers. Many key products for the powerful Mercosul agribusiness face 
either TRQ’s 
3– making the equivalent a function of the particular year used – 
or prohibitive escalating tariffs which, by highly restraining trade, place one at 
the  borderline  of  validity  of  the  methodology  adopted.  In  this  regard,  it 
wouldn’t perhaps be unfair to say that our dollar totals are lower bounds to the 
revenues due to liberalisation. 
The  third  limitation  is  a  warning  that  must  be  made.  As  explained, 
products are identified with the help of indexes computed on the actual trade 
flows. It might be that, for a specific sector, sure to gain with the agreement, no 
results appear. Though we think that our final lists are pretty close, in product 
content, to the key “winners”, this is possible. The reason would be that, for 
some motive, the product, though competitive, has its flow (to the partner and 
maybe to the world) strongly constrained. One of the most frequent motives for 
this is, again, the existence of extremely high barriers – as happens in the EU 
side –, making the actual flows negligible. In such case, the complementarity 
and comparative advantage indexes will produce values not high enough for the 
product to be selected. 
 
2.  Detailed Results. 
Table 1 summarises the total number of selected products for each bloc. 
 
                                                            
2 See Table 10, in section 3. 
3 Tariff-rate Quotas are a device created by the EU to comply – at a minimal change – with requirements 
of the Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay Round (see, for instance, Abbott (2002)).  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 by here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Market access simulations were performed for a subset of the products 
exhibiting trade opportunities. In the case of the EU, out of the 842 selected in 
2000-2001, a total of 100 products with potential trade expansion were used, 
representing a share of 18,42 per cent of total EU exports to Mercosul. These 
100  products  were  chosen  as  the  most  representative  ones  in  terms  of 
opportunities, based on their generated total trade effects (trade creation and 
trade  diversion).  All  the  72  opportunities  identified  for  Mercosul  were 
examined. 
 
2.1.  The EU gains. 
Table 2 details, at the two-digits level of the HS, the opportunities for the 
EU, considering the 2000-2001 period. Their number is quite high and, if 239 
out of the 842 products are in sector 84 (nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, 
etc),  significant  frequencies  are  found  in  sectors  85  (electrical,  electronic 
equipment), 90 (optical, photo, technical, medical, etc, apparatus), 48 (paper 
and paperboard, articles of pulp, paper and board), 29 (organic chemicals), 73 
(articles  of  iron  or  steel),  32  (tanning,  dyeing  extracts,  tannins,  derivs., 
pigments,  etc),  39  (plastics  and  articles  thereof)  and  82  (tools,  implements, 
cutlery, etc, of base metal). Actually, in sixty-four out of the ninety-six sectors 
in the HS, at least one product was selected. In the case of the golden years 
period,  though  more  opportunities  were  identified,  1  086,  their  frequency 
distribution along the sectors is quite close to the previous one. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 by here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 The core of our results is a set of lists, ranked by total market access gains 
(under full liberalisation of trade barriers), of all the indexes and computations 
corresponding to the top 100 selected products. We shall discuss the values 
obtained  as  the  arithmetic  average  of  the  results  with  the  three  different 
elasticities used 
4.  
  Market access gains for this subset, now distributed along 24 two-digits 
sectors, decrease very slowly in all cases. The top product (medicaments n.e.s., 
in dosage) presents, in 2000-2001 values, a 93,0 mi US$ gain; the one in the 
hundredth  position  (mountings,  fittings  &  similar  articles  of  base  metal  for 
furnitures) still displays a total gain of 4,8 mi US$, a value slightly superior to 
1/20 of the top one. As a percentage of each product exports, the gains range 
from 13 to 62 per cent; even the lowest bound is not a negligible figure. All this 
calls attention to the variety of significant market penetration possibilities that 
the Agreement may open to European exporters.  
The added gains – under total liberalisation – amount to 1,20 bn US$. 
Keeping in mind the remarks on the meaning of this sum, it turns out to be 
around  6  per  cent  of  current  annual  EU  exports  to  Mercosul;  something 
attractive  and  not  usually  obtained  in  a  standard  preferential  agreement
5. 
Moving to a fifty per cent reduction in the barriers, still produces a figure of 
0,61 bn US$. 
  For all opportunities, the trade deviation figure is never higher than the 
trade creation one. This is good news for both sides. For EU businesses, it 
confirms  their  competitiveness  in  the  international  arena;  for  Mercosul,  it 
signals that the Agreement won’t imply a great distortion in its import flows. 
Moreover,  for  quite  many  products,  the  deviation  is  much  lower  than  the 
creation – for eight of them, it is even around or smaller than 15 per cent of the 
                                                            
4 All the lists/figures produced (the average values, those related to the lower and upper bounds 
for the elasticities, as well as those under a 50 per cent reduction in the trade barriers and the 
whole corresponding set for the 1997-1998 base period) are available from the authors. 
5  It  is  maybe  worth  reminding  that  general  equilibrium  evaluations,  even  under  imperfect 
competition, produce gains of at most 2 per cent in this case. creation
6.  This  means  that,  for  many  Mercosul  markets,  very  likely  the 
Agreement does create trade, in the best classical sense of the concept. 
  As  mentioned  above,  two-digit  sectors  where  more  products  were 
identified aren’t necessarily those where the highest gains are found. Table 3, 
another partial synthesis of the top 100 results, shows the five two-digit sectors 
where the highest (aggregate) gains occur. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 by here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
     At the aggregation level of the table, concentration is more evident. The 
five sectors comprise 69 out of the 100 products, accounting for nearly 75 per 
cent of the total gains. It is also worth noticing that the gains in the “machinery 
and electrical & electronic equipment sectors” (84 and 85) amount to more than 
half of the total gains. 
Table  4  provides  a  consistency  check  to  the  previous  findings.  Most 
products in it – precisely 17 out of the 25 top EU exports - are already fully (or 
close to) exploiting their possibilities. However, for 8 products, combination of 
the  tariff  values  with  the  European  competitiveness  still  opens  further 
opportunities for them. Of these, 6 belong to sectors in Table 3 (three to 84, two 
to 85 and one to 30), the “newcomers” being whiskies and perfume & toilet 
waters.  For  these  two,  estimated  gains  are  of  17,1  and  17,3  mi  US$, 
respectively, both higher than 15 per cent of the present flows. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





2.2.  The Mercosul gains. 
                                                            
6 An emblematic, and very easy to understand example of these eight goods is whiskies, for Table  5  shows,  at  the  two-digits  level  of  the  HS,  the  frequency  of 
opportunities  selected  for  Mercosur,  considering  the  2000-2001  period.  The 
number of sectors is much inferior than the one in Table 2; only 28, comprising 
72 products. The highest frequencies are in sectors 02 (meat and edible meat 
offal),  03  (fish,  crustaceans,  molluscs,  aquatic  invertebrates  n.e.s.)  and  20 
(vegetable, fruit, nut, etc food preparations). Again, there isn’t much difference 
from  the  1997-1998  pattern,  though  the  latter  is  a  little  more  positive.  The 
predominance of the food and agriculture sectors is remarkable, followed by 
traditional  manufactures,  notably  textiles.  In  the  more  modern  sectors,  7 
products  were  identified,  5  being  in  chemical-related  ones  –  28  (inorganic 
chemicals, precious metal compounds, isotopes), 29 (organic chemicals) and 35 
(albuminoids, modified starches, glues, enzymes) – and two in the electrical, 
electronic equipment sector 85.  
As  in  the  corresponding  EU  case,  we  shall  mainly  discuss  the  results 
concerning  the  72  opportunities  identified  for  2000-2001,  under  total 
liberalisation, and obtained as the arithmetic average of those obtained with the 
three different elasticity values 
7.  
Given the more limited scope of Mercosul flows, for the last 11 of the 72 
products, the gain was negligible (smaller than 1000 US$). It is worth noticing 
that, for only 17 of the 61 products with non-zero gains, trade creation is higher 
than trade deviation, signalling that, as regards the Mercosul penetration, it is 
likely to be more trade distorting than the EU one. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




The  distribution  of  the  gains  for  the  winning  products  is  quite 
concentrated, the first three top goods – orange juice, bovine cuts boneless, 
fresh or chilled and frozen - accounting for a little more than 50 per cent of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
which trade creation amounts to 16,7 mi US$, and the deviation is 0,4 mi US$. 
7 All results - as in footnote 4 - can be obtained from the authors. total. If market access gains are extremely high for these products – 275,9 ; 
234,8 and 219,6 mi US$ -, they are lower than 100 000 US$ from the fifty-fifth 
product onwards. At this position, in the similar EU ranking, the corresponding 
value  is  7,4  mi  US$.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sum  of  all  gains  under  total 
liberalisation amounts to 1,45 bn US$, a figure more than 10 per cent higher 
than the one obtained for the top 100 EU opportunities. Actually, it represents 
around  8  per  cent  of  current  annual  exports;  again  something  extremely 
attractive for a standard preferential agreement. A fifty per cent reduction in the 
barriers produces a figure of 0,74 bn US$. 
  In  the  Mercosul  case,  two-digit  sectors  where  more  products  were 
identified  correspond  somewhat  better  to  those  where  the  highest  gains  are 
found.  Table  6  shows  the  aggregate  gain  for  the  five  top  two-digit  sectors 
related to the 72 products. For the first two sectors, significant trade creation 
takes  place,  confirming  the  well-known  Mercosur  competitiveness  in  these 
areas. However, for the other three, evidence of distortions is present, the only 
exception being anchovies (030563). 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 by here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
   If one adds to the five sectors in Table 6 the next two ones – comprising 
then, 37 out of the 72 products identified -, the total gain related to these seven 
sectors is 1,38 mi US$, i.e., 95,2 per cent of the figure for the 72 products. No 
wonder, the focus for Mercosur negotiators is quite clear and restricted.  
Though modest, a global gain of 7,6 mi US$ in the four more advanced 
sectors  previously  mentioned  (28,  29,  35  and  85)  raises  hopes  for  their 
development. 
Table 7 provides additional consistency to the findings above. In a way 
similar to the EU case (Table 4), 18 products seem to be already exploiting 
their market possibilities, only 7 identified products appearing in the top 25. However,  in  a  dramatic  demonstration  of  how  key  Mercosul  interests  are 
concentrated  in  few  markets,  already  penetrated  by  its  goods,  the  seven 
identified products are exactly the seven top ones in the total gains ranking. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




3.  Results: A More General View. 
 
Trade between the EU and Mercosul is more important for the latter, the 
former accounting for around ¼ of either Mercosul imports or exports. Until 
1994, the balance of trade was favourable to the Southern Cone, but since 
1995 the situation has been reversed. Indeed, exports to the EU, after having 
reached a peak in 1997-98, present a declining trend, while imports have been 
less sensitive to the crises Mercosul experienced around 2000. Table 8 shows 
the trade flows for the last half of the nineties, adding numerical support to 
these considerations. The preferential agreement stands as an important way 




Insert Table 8 by here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A closer look at the structure of the trade flows reveals that Mercosul 
exports are, much more than the EU ones, concentrated in a well-defined group 
of products. Taking the 2000-2001 period, at the six-digit level, the 25 most 
important Mercosul exports to the EU accounted for a little more than 60 per 
cent of total exports to the region, while the same procedure from the EU side produces 25 goods accounting for less than 27 per cent of total EU exports to 
Mercosul
8.  
Mercosul  barriers  to  EU  goods  give  way  to  a  higher  (simple)  average 
equivalent tariff, with practically no peaks, but the opposite is true for the EU 
barriers,  where  a  significant  number  of  peaks  (high  to  very  high  tariff 
equivalents) is present in a set for which the average tariff is reasonably low
9. 
The two points above are fundamental in explaining, in a global way, our 
results. Mercosul gains should, consequently, be much more concentrated, with 
their larger values associated to a few products which face the present peaks. 
Most  of  these  are,  as  expected,  in  the  agricultural  commodities  and  food 
sectors. EU gains resulted more evenly spread, comprising a large portfolio of 
diversified exports. 
Table  9  and  Figure  1  add  further  evidence  to  the  above,  confirming 
remarks already made in section 3. The table shows the quartiles of the two 
distributions of gains. Taking the third quartile (Q3), which is roughly the same 
in both cases, the drastic fall below it and the steep rise after it, for Mercosul, 
contrast with the much smoother European progression. The same statistics for 




Insert Table 9 by here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure  1  displays  scatter  diagrams  of  the  trade  diversion  versus  trade 
creation values for both cases. While for the EU (Figure 1.b.) all points are 
above the 45 degrees line, the opposite is most of the times true for Mercosul. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                            
8 See also Tables 5 and 7 in section 2. 
9 Simple averages of ad valorem tariffs, over the HS eight-digit level, give, for Mercosul, the 
value of 10,8 , while, for the EU, 4,9. Insert Figure 1by here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Finally, Table 10 gives an idea of the sensitivity of results. Elasticities do 
matter, the intervals being quite large. In a rough approximation, their sizes are 
around the order of magnitude of the lower bound; as the values discussed in 
the text are close to the midpoints, this means that actual gains can be either 1/3 
lower or higher. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 by here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
According to the last offers presented by both sides, concessions have a 
timing and, of course, encompass – though perhaps not as much as the EU 
desired – liberalisation or transparency measures in services and government 
procurement, as well as stronger enforcement of selected intellectual property 
rights issues. From the evidences produced in this paper, a crude estimate of a 
lower bound for all the (long run) gains each community could then reap would 
be  around  1,5  bn  US$  -  something  more  or  less,  depending  on  the  global 
dynamics of the liberalisation.  
 
4.  Conclusions. 
 
The European Union has continually stressed the theme of social cohesion 
in its relations with Latin America. Mercosul, for obvious reasons, is entirely in 
favour of this approach as a threading line for all its exchanges with the EU. 
Notwithstanding, economic forces are the engine that sets integration in motion 
and, eventually,  makes societies come closer and share, in a consistent and 
lasting way, a common core of values, founded on similar living standards. The very  European  experience,  since  the  Treaty  of  Rome  till  the  May  1;  2004 
Enlargement, is a telling illustration of this argument. 
The economic motor is the combination of thousands, if not millions of 
interactions,  that  progressively  create  the  ties  and  set  the  bounds  related  to 
different activities, ever designing a mesh of exchanges that unavoidably links 
the economies involved.  
In this vein, the EU-Mercosul Agreement, beyond a source of profits for 
both  partners,  can  be  a  concrete  way  of  strengthening  the  EU-Mercosul 
partnership. Great imbalances, in terms of the global gains it will open for the 
case of trade in goods don’t seem to exist.   
Signing of the Agreement will open a wide spectrum of opportunities for 
the EU businesses. Many of these will ease the path for deeper services trade. 
In  the  Mercosul  side,  its  internationally  competitive  exporters  will  gain  a 
substantial  and  well-deserved  market  access  in  sectors  where,  though 
constrained nowadays, they already are reasonably positioned.  
For  Mercosul,  it  is  evident  why  its  negotiators  stick  so  toughly  to 
concessions  in  agriculture:  most  of  its  gains  will  come  from  there.  But  the 
Agreement can also act as a first serious trial for future liberalisations with 
other  internationally  competitive  partners.  It  raises  a  warning  on  needed 
competitiveness improvements in the industrial sectors, in a forthcoming freer 
multilateral trading environment.   
 
 
Annex: Methodological Aspects. 
 
A.1. The Trade Complementarity and Related Indexes. 
At the product level, opportunities are identified with the help of the following 
indexes. 
The  Trade  Complementarity  Index  (TCI)  for  product/good  k,  exported  from 























TCI × =                                 ,                           (1) 
       where, 
k
i X = country i‘s exports of good k, 
i X = total exports of country i, 
k
j M = country j ‘s imports of good k, 
j M = total imports from country j, 
k
W M = world imports of good k,  
W M = total world imports. 
The TCI measures the level of complementarity between the export supply and the 
import demand structures of the two countries or regions; the greater this similarity, 
the more likely trade between them is. Values greater (less) than 1 imply a strong 
(weak) complementarity between the export specialisation of a country and the import 
specialisation of its partner.  
The  TCI  can  be  decomposed  as  the  product  of  two  well-known  indexes:  the 
Revealed  Comparative  Advantage  or  Export  Specialisation  Index  (RCA)  of  the 
exporting  country  i  and  the  Revealed  Comparative  Disadvantage  or  Import 




























RCD =         .                                            (3) 
 
The RCA equals the ratio between the share of a product in a country’s total 
exports and that of the same product in world  trade; it roughly shows the export 
specialisation of a country. When the RCA is greater than 1, the country is more export oriented in that particular  good than the “world average”  and, therefore, it 
displays a revealed comparative advantage in that particular good.  
Analogously,  the  RCD  equals  the  ratio  between  the  share  of  the  product  in  a 
country’s total imports and the corresponding share in world trade. When the import 
specialisation index is greater than 1, the country reveals a comparative disadvantage 
in that good. 
Letting A stand for either Mercosul or the EU, and B for the other bloc, once A is 
chosen,  the  three  requirements  for  identifying  opportunities  for  bloc  A,  stated  in 
section 2, can be rephrased as: 
i)  their TCI (as exports from A to B) is higher than 1; 
ii)  their RCA (as exports from A ) is higher than 1; 
iii)  the tariff equivalent they face in B is equal or superior to 10 per cent. 
 
A2. The Simulation Model 
Once the products are identified, a ranking of trade opportunities is produced. In 
order to achieve this, we estimate the trade effects resulting from a reduction in the 
tariff and non-tariff barriers – the ad valorem tariff equivalent – present in both 
sides. The simulations are based in a model originally developed by Cline et. al. 
(1978) and used, among others, by Laird and Yeats (1990) and Vaillant and Ons 
(2002), to analyse the effects of either changes in trade preferences or unilateral 
trade liberalisations. 
The model assumes that the import demand function of country j for a good (k) 
produced in country i may be expressed as
10: 
) , , ( ij ji j ji P P Y F M =       ,                                                       (4) 
where  ji P  is the price of the good in the importing country j, or the final domestic 
price of the good,  ij P  is the price of the good in the exporting country i (or the  
export/world price of the good),  and   j Y  is the national income in country j. 
Country i ’s export supply function to country j may be written as: 
) ( ij ij P F X =       ,                                               (5) 
equations (4) and (5) being related by the market clearing condition, ij ji X M =       .                                      (6) 
The domestic price of the good in the importing market j can be expressed as the 
product of the export price by the ad valorem equivalent tariff  ji t  : 
) 1 ( ji ij ji t P P + =     .                                      (7) 
The Trade-Creation Effect  
is the increased demand in country j for the good exported by country i, resulting 
from the price decrease associated to the reduction or elimination (in country j) of 
the tariff equivalent  ji t , all imports from other destinations being frozen.  
Using  discrete  rates  of  change  (represented  byD)  for  the  variables,  from 
equation (7) we can write:  
ij ji ji ij ji P t t P P D + + D = D ) 1 (
1 0                                                              (8) 
where 
1
ji t is the tariff applied after trade liberalisation, the superscripts accounting 
for the periods before (0) and after liberalisation (1).  
The formula for the elasticity of import demand with respect to the domestic 
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  ,  the 
increase in imports becomes: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 As a Partial Equilibrium model, it calculates the trade liberalisation effects on a single market. 
To simplify the notation we do not include subscript k for the good, but the reader should bear 
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   .                                         (12) 
Assuming that the elasticity of export supply with respect to the world price is 
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ij V   is the value of imports, and the only parameter needed to compute (13) is 
the import demand elasticity Em . 
The Trade Diversion Effect 
refers to the tendency of importers to substitute trade flows from one source for 
another, in response to a change in the import price of supplies from the latter. 
 Different options have been used to estimate trade diversion effects (see, for 
instance, Baldwin and  Murray (1977)); our method follows the proposal by Cline 
et. al. (1978), which supposes that explicit values for the elasticities of substitution 
between goods from different sources are available. 
To generalise the trade diversion results, we assume that the importing country 
offers preferential treatment to a group of countries (subscript B) and as a result of 
this  policy,  imports  from  non-preference-receiving  countries  (subscript  NB)  are 
being affected.  
It is possible to define the elasticity of substitution between imports  from B and 



















=        ,                                          (14) 
 
where jB M  ( jNB M ) are defined as imports from the preference-receiving countries 
(non-preference-receiving countries) by country j, and  jB P  ( jNB P ) is the price in country  j  of  the  good  imported  from  the  countries  belonging  to  the  preferential 
agreement (non-preference receiving countries).  
We define the share of bloc-countries (no bloc-countries) in total imports of 










= f                (15) 
so that                                  1 = + jB jNB f f                                   .   
The trade diversion effect can be written in the following way, 
jW jB jB jB M TD ) (
0 1 f f - = D       .                                          (16) 
As total imports remain constant, i.e.,  jW jW jW M M M = =
1 0  , after some tedious 


































f            .                                 (17) 
 






























               .                              (18) 
 
An estimate of the ratio between the two volumes of imports is then needed. 
Moreover, the relative price (finite) difference appearing in (18) – known as the 
price effect – is also needed. We then assume that the export supply elasticity of the 
non-preference receiving countries is infinite; this means that the world price of the 
products exported by the extra-bloc countries is kept fixed. Given that the tariff 
levied on these extra-bloc countries by country j remains fixed, the domestic price of 
extra-bloc imports remains equally fixed. As a result, the proportional change in the domestic relative price B-NB is equal to the proportional change in the domestic 
price  jB P . 
Taking the above into account, using the definitions for the import demand and 
export  supply  elasticities,  the  market  clearing  condition,  and  a  little  algebra,  it 
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By way of (19), and supposing that 
0 0
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where the V’s stand for the volume of imports (in money values) and, as in (13), the 
only needed parameter is an elasticity, now the substitution elasticity Es.   
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Table 1: Products selected in each bloc. 
Period  No. of opportunities  % of Total Exports 
a) For the European Union (in the Mercosul market). 
1997/1998  1086  37,1 
2000/2001  842  34,5 
b) For Mercosul (in the EU) market. 
        1997/1998  81         15,8 
        2000/2001 
1  72         15,2 
1 For the products belonging to the subheadings 020130 to 020230, and 160250 to 160300 
(products ancillary to the bovine meat sector), the average has been computed over 1999/2000, 




Table 2 : EU - MERCOSUL Agreement; Frequency of Opportunities for the EU, by 
(two-digits) sectors of the Harmonised System. Period 2000-2001. 
 
HS, Rv. 2  Description of the Sector  Number of 
Opportunities 
03  Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates nes  2 
04  Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible animal product nes  3 
08  Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons  1 
09  Coffee, tea, mate and spices  2 
11  Milling products, malt, starches, inulin, wheat gluten  4 
15  Animal,vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc  5 
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery  2 
18  Cocoa and cocoa preparations  1 
19  Cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations and products  2 
20  Vegetable, fruit, nut, etc food preparations  6 
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations  4 
22  Beverages, spirits and vinegar  5 
24  Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes  2 
28  Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes  12 
29  Organic chemicals  24 
30  Pharmaceutical products  10 
32  Tanning, dyeing extracts, tannins, derivs,pigments etc  21 
33  Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toileteries  15 
34  Soaps, lubricants, waxes, candles, modelling pastes  14 
35  Albuminoids, modified starches, glues, enzymes  8 
37  Photographic or cinematographic goods  5 
38  Miscellaneous chemical products  17 
39  Plastics and articles thereof  19 
40  Rubber and articles thereof  14 
41  Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather  5 
42  Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel goods  4 
44  Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal  1 
45  Cork and articles of cork  3 48  Paper & paperboard, articles of pulp, paper and board  26 
49  Printed books, newspapers, pictures etc  1 
51  Wool, animal hair, horsehair yarn and fabric thereof  1 
52  Cotton  14 
54  Manmade filaments  11 
55  Manmade staple fibres  12 
56  Wadding, felt, nonwovens, yarns, twine, cordage, etc  7 
57  Carpets and other textile floor coverings  2 
58  Special woven or tufted fabric, lace, tapestry etc  7 
59  Impregnated, coated or laminated textile fabric  12 
60  Knitted or crocheted fabric  1 
61  Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet  8 
62  Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet  10 
63  Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing etc  5 
64  Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof  2 
68  Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica, etc articles  3 
69  Ceramic products  5 
70  Glass and glassware  12 
71  Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc  6 
72  Iron and steel  11 
73  Articles of iron or steel  23 
74  Copper and articles thereof  5 
75  Nickel and articles thereof  5 
76  Aluminium and articles thereof  2 
82  Tools, implements, cutlery, etc of base metal  19 
83  Miscellaneous articles of base metal  9 
84  Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc  239 
85  Electrical, electronic equipment  69 
86  Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment  9 
87  Vehicles other than railway, tramway  12 
89  Ships, boats and other floating structures  8 
90  Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc apparatus  47 
91  Clocks and watches and parts thereof  3 
92  Musical instruments, parts and accessories  5 93  Arms and ammunition, parts and accessories thereof  7 
94  Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings  4 
96  Miscellaneous manufactured articles  9 






Table 3: EU gains
* (in million, 2000-2001, US$) in the top two-digits sectors related 
to the 100 most important products, under total trade liberalisation. 
Top 5 Sectors  Gains  (number of products) 
84. Nuc. Reactors, boilers, machinery, etc   412,0  (31) 
85. Electrical and electronic equipment  206,2  (15) 
30. Pharmaceutical products.  114,9  (9) 
90. Optic., photo, tech. & med. apparatus  87,0  (8) 
48. Paper & paperboard and rel. articles  77,2  (6) 
TOTALS  897,3  (69) 
* Arithmetic average of the results obtained with the three elasticity values. 
 
 Table 4: Selected Characteristics and Opportunities Among the 25 Top EU Exports 
to Mercosul. Period 2000-2001; Exports in 1000 US$.  
Product  Description  Exports  Tariff  Chosen ?  
870899 Motor vehicle parts nes  1 029 615  9,00  NO 
880240 Aircraft nes of an unladen weight exceeding 15,000 kg  541 552  0,00  NO 
300490 Medicaments nes, in dosage  420 736  10,58  YES 
880330 Aircraft parts nes  405 239  0,00  NO 
851790 Parts of electrical apparatus for line telephone or line telegraphy  334 271  6,33  NO 
870323 
 
Automob. w/ reciprocat. piston engine displac. > 1500 cc to 3000 cc  301 105  20,00  NO 
851740 Apparatus, for carrier-current line systems, nes  266 214  0,00  NO 
852990 Parts suitable f use solely/princ w the app of headings 85.25 to 85.28  231 972  8,57  NO 
870829 Parts and accessories of bodies nes for motor vehicles  227 351  13,67  NO 
847989 Machines & mechanical appliances nes having individual functions  179 792  12,00  YES 
300220 Vaccines, human use  130 053  2,22  NO 
840999 Parts for diesel and semi-diesel engines  126 520  16,00  YES 
852520 
 
Transmission appar., for radioteleph. Incorporat. Reception 
apparatus  122 684  8,80  NO 
490199 Books, brochures, leaflets and similar printed matter, nes  122 626  0,00  NO 
310490 Mineral/chemical fertilizers,potassic,nes,in packages weighg > 10 kg  117 832  3,00  NO 
840734 Engines, spark-ignition reciprocating displacing more than 1000 cc  114 020  18,00  NO 
300210 Antisera and other blood fractions  113 633  3,10  NO 
711319 Art. of jewellry & pt therof of/o prec. met. w/n platd/clad w prec t  113 254  18,00  NO 
220830 Whiskies  112 515  17,33  YES 
847990 Parts of machines & mechanical appl. nes havg individual functions  106 614  15,00  YES 
853690 Electrical app for switchg/protec elec circuits,not exced 1,000 V,nes  104 601  14,80  YES 
844319 Offset printing machinery nes  99 244  7,00  NO 
847330 
 
Parts & access. of automatic data process. machines & units thereof  97 760  4,70  NO 
330300 
 
Perfumes and toilet waters  96 721  18,00  YES 
853890 Parts for use with the appar. of headg no. 85.35,85.36 or 85.37,nes  92 481  10,00  YES 




 Table 5: EU - MERCOSUL Agreement; Frequency of Opportunities for Mercosur, by 
(two-digits) sectors of the Harmonised System. Period 2000-2001. 
HS, Rev 2  Description of the Sector  Number of 
Opportunities 
02  Meat and edible meat offal  6 
03  Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates nes  10 
04  Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible animal product nes  1 
07  Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers  1 
08  Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons  5 
09  Coffee, tea, mate and spices  1 
10  Cereals  3 
11  Milling products, malt, starches, inulin, wheat gluten  2 
16  Meat, fish and seafood food preparations nes  2 
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery  2 
18  Cocoa and cocoa preparations  2 
19  Cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations and products  1 
20  Vegetable, fruit, nut, etc food preparations  8 
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations  1 
22  Beverages, spirits and vinegar  1 
24  Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes  3 
28  Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes  1 
29  Organic chemicals  3 
35  Albuminoids, modified starches, glues, enzymes  1 
56  Wadding, felt, nonwovens, yarns, twine, cordage, etc  3 
60  Knitted or crocheted fabric  1 
61  Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet  1 
62  Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet  2 
63  Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing etc  4 
64  Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof  2 
70  Glass and glassware  1 
82  Tools, implements, cutlery, etc of base metal  2 
85  Electrical, electronic equipment  2 







Table 6: Mercosul gains
* (in million, 2000-2001, US$) in the top two-digits sectors 
related to the 72 products, under total trade liberalisation. 
Top 5 Sectors  Gains  (number of products) 
02. Meat and edible meat offal.   480,1  (6) 
20. Vegetable, fruit, nut, etc food prep.  414,0  (8) 
03. Fish, crustac., molluscs, aq. Inverteb.  175,0  (10) 
24. Tobacco and manuf. tobacco subst.  108,2  (3) 
10. Cereals  78,3  (3) 
TOTALS  1 255,6  (30) 




Table  7:  Selected  Characteristics  and  Opportunities  Among  the  25  Top  Mercosul 
Exports to the EU. Period 2000-2001; Exports in US$.  
Product  Description  Exports  Tariff  Chosen ? 
230400  Soya-bean oil-cake&oth solid residues,whether or not ground or pellet  2 833 133  0,00  NO 
120100  Soya beans  1 684 266  0,00  NO 
090111  Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated  793 563  3,30  NO 
260111  Iron ores&concentrates,oth than roasted iron pyrites,non-agglomerated  726 193  0,00  NO 
880230  Aircraft nes of an unladen weight > 2,000 kg but not exceedg 15,000 kg  643 756  1,90  NO 
200911  Orange juice,unfermentd&not spiritd,whether/not sugard/sweet,frozen  624 503  41,78  YES 
470329  Chemical wood pulp,soda/sulphate,non-coniferous,semi-bl/bleachd,nes  573 984  0,00  NO 
760110  Aluminium unwrought, not alloyed  384 315  6,00  NO 
020130  Bovine cuts boneless, fresh or chilled  375 074  91,00  YES 
240120  Tobacco, unmanufactured, partly or wholly stemmed or stripped  355 631  14,70  YES 
260112  Iron ores & concentrates,other than roasted iron pyrites,agglomerated  343 990  0,00  NO 
030613  Shrimps and prawns, frozen, in shell or not, including boiled in shell  320 470  14,80  YES 
020230  Bovine cuts boneless, frozen  313 686  193,03  YES 
020741  Fowl cuts and offal, domestic, except livers, frozen  293 481  0,00  NO 
410422  Bovine leather, otherwise pre-tanned, nes  277 329  3,35  NO 
880240  Aircraft nes of an unladen weight exceeding 15,000 kg  246 817  1,80  NO 
160250  Bovine meat and meat offal nes,excluding livers, prepared or preserved  212 240  26,17  YES 
100590  Maize (corn) nes  211 099  115,00  YES 
410431  Bovine and equine leather, full/split grains, nes  174 187  6,55  NO 
870421  Diesel powered trucks with a GVW not exceeding five tonnes  147 177  13,80  NO 
840991  Parts for spark-ignition type engines nes  145 610  3,60  NO 
260300  Copper ores and concentrates  142 501  0,00  NO 
720712  Semi-fin prod,iron/n-al steel,rect/sq cross sect,cntg by wgt<.25% carb  135 558  2,45  NO 
840999  Parts for diesel and semi-diesel engines  132 392  3,60  NO 
760120  Aluminium unwrought, alloyed  130 300  6,00  NO 
Total     12 221 249      
 
 
Table 8: Mercosul trade flows (in billion US$) with the EU, 1996-2000. 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Exports  18,3  19,5  20,1  19,2  17,3 
Imports  21,9  25,7  26,5  22,9  18,9 
Total trade  40,2  45,2  46,6  42,1  36,2 
    Source: DATA INTAL, Inter-American Development Bank.  
 
 




a) For all computed gains. 
Min  0  4 809 
Q1  233  6 042 
Median
  1 614  7 774 
Q3  11 512  12 270 
Max  275 877  92 975 
b) For the higher quarter. 
Min  13 007  12 307 
Q1  16 516  13 963 
Median
  23 055  21 596 
Q3  101 812  25 267 
Max  275 877  92 975 
 
1  72 observations/products; 




Table 10: Lower and upper bounds
1 for the five top gains, EU and Mercosul. 
Order of the gains  Mercosul
  EU
 
Top  178 198  ;  386 608  59 274  ;  131 304 
2nd top  152 148  ;  328 447  32 718  ;  71 757 
3rd top  140 811  ;  309 428  29 905  ;  65 980 
4th top  77 371  ;  170 639  25 266  ;  55 726 
5th top  71 457  ; 148 241  22 507  ;  49 704 
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